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When Should judges Admit 
or Compel Genetic Tests? 
Four hypotheticals involved civil cases: 
two in the context of causation for tort lia-
bility and two involving determination of 
damages. In the causation cases, the defen-
dant sought to have the judge compel a 
genetic test to show that the plaintiff's 
developmental disabilities were due to a 
genetic defect rather than the defendant's 
negligence. The first was a malpractice case 
against an obstetrician for a birth injury. 
The second was a toxic torts case against a 
solvent manufacturer in which the genetic 
condition manifested only as a result of 
having both a gene mutation and exposure 
to a chemical solvent. In both cases the 
injured parties were children. 
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During the past two decades, the use of DNA tests has revolutionized court proceedings in criminal and 
paternity cases. The tests' availability has 
arguably eliminated the need for "judg-
ing" as the tests provide virtually conclu-
sive evidence of identity. On the horizon is 
a new challenge for judges-whether to 
admit or compel genetic tests to confirm 
or predict genetic diseases and conditions 
in other judicial contexts, including deci-
sions regarding culpability, sentencing, 
liability, causation, and damages. Al-
though the bulk of these new uses of 
genetic tests are in the torts area (1, 2), 
their use has also been reported or pro-
posed in criminal, family law, employ-
ment, and discrimination cases (3). 
In civil cases, courts may compel a 
genetic test pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or compa-
rable state law. Rule 35 allows a court to 
order physical :>r mental examinations if 
the person subject to examination has 
placed her mental or physical condition "in 
controversy" and if "good cause" exists for 
the examiriation. "Good cause" depends on 
relevance and need, including whether the 
information may be obtained by other 
means. In personal injury actions, failure to 
comply with an order for a medical exam 
may result in dismissal of the case. 
In criminal cases, a request to compel a 
saliva sample for purposes of genetic test-
ing has been determined to constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. Such 
searches must be reasonable, i.e., strike a 
balance between individual privacy inter-
ests and law enforcement needs. 
Sometimes, the test result may already 
exist as a result of medical care, and the 
judge must decide whether to admit the 
information. In addition to meeting the 
standard for admissibility of scientific evi-
dence in a given jurisdiction, the evidence 
must be relevant (make some fact that is of 
consequence to the outcome of the case 
more or less probable). The probative value 
of a genetic test result may depend on a 
variety of factors, including the accuracy 
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and reliability of the test, the penetrance of 
the gene, the severity of the disease, and the 
impact of environmental causes. Even rele-
vant evidence may be excluded, however, if 
the judge concludes that its admission risks 
inflaming or confusing the jury, is cumula-
tive of other evidence, or would unduly 
delay the case. 
To better understand judicial perspec-
tives about the value of genetic informa-
tion, we conducted a survey of all trial court 
judges (state and federal) in Maryland. 
Among other questions, judges were given 
In the first damage case, the defendant 
asked the judge to compel the plaintiff to 
have a genetic test for neurofibromatosis 
type 2 (NF2), which would significantly 
shorten the plaintiff's life expectancy and 
thus the amount the defendant would be 
required to pay in damages. In the second 
NUMBER OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS- RAW DATA* 
Survey question State judges Federal judges 
Yes No Yes No 
·······~·· -····-·-----·-······ .. ····--··-·····--------·-·---·-····---·-··-·-· ··-·-·-··---·----·--··--·-·· 
Criminal cases 
Admit genetic test for schizophrenia? 50 42 5 8 
Compel genetic test for condition leading to bouts of rage? 17 75 2 11 
···········----·--·--·-·-··-··-----····· ········-·--·-···---------····- ··--··--·---·----·--·-·--·-·····-···-·····-···-··-·--·-·----·---·-·-···--
Civil tort cases: Causation 
Compel test for Fragile X syndrome? 77 14 9 3 
Compel test for complex genetic condition caused by 
combination of environmental and genetic factors? 
65 26 10 3 
Civil tort cases: Damages 
Compel test for neurofibromatosis 
Admit test for pain? 
•Not .aU judges responded to each question. 
2? 
several hypothetical cases and asked 
whether they would admit or compel a 
genetic test in a variety of scenarios ( 4). The 
hypotheticals (some based on actual cases) 
(5-8) were designed to glean information 
about the importance of different contex-
tual factors, including whether the request 
was to admit or compel, the purpose of the 
information, and the characteristics of the 
genetic condition and test. 
Two hypotheticals were based on crimi-
nal cases. Respondents were first asked 
whether they would admit a positive genetic 
test for schizophrenia to establish that the 
defendant did not have the necessary crimi-
nal intent (mens rea) to commit the crime. 
Respondents were also asked whether, in a 
sentencing proceeding, they would compel 
a test for a condition that predisposes an 
individual to bouts of rage (proclivity to 
"future dangerousness"). 
39 
73 
50 
16 
5 
8 
8 
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damage case, the plaintiff requested that the 
judge admit a genetic test to show that he 
had a heightened sensitivity to pain and 
thereby potentially increase his damage 
award. In each case, respondents were 
asked, assuming the relevant scientific evi-
dentiary standard had been met, whether 
they would admit or compel the test. If they 
answered no, they were asked to provide the 
reasons for their decision. 
Of 140 state trial court judges in 
Maryland, 101 responded to the written sur-
vey and 16 of the 25 federal district court 
judges in the state responded. After the 
results were tabulated, we met with groups of 
judges in five of the state circuits and the fed-
eral district court to share our fmdings and to 
solicit their reactions (see table, above). 
The judges were almost equally divided 
on whether they would admit a positive test 
for schizophrenia in a criminal case to dis-
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prove mens rea. Several described this as a 
"gray area" where the ultimate question 
would be whether the information would be 
more prejudicial than probative. The judges 
differed on how a jury would interpret the 
test result: some thought a jury would give 
it more weight than it deserves; others felt 
that an expert could help jurors interpret 
the test results. 
A large majority of judges said they 
would not compel a genetic test for a condi-
tion leading to bouts of rage in a criminal 
sentencing. Respondents felt that the test 
was an "inexact" instrument that could 
brand someone for life and would be espe-
cially stigmatizing in the context of mental 
health. A few judges, however, argued that 
because the defendant had been convicted, 
his privacy interest was already diminished. 
Furthermore, they reasoned, because judges 
must assess risk, this information might 
assist them in predicting future dangerous-
ness, especially when the defendant has no 
prior criminal record. 
In contrast to the criminal cases, the 
large majority of judges in the civil cases for 
tort liability would compel a test to establish 
that the defendant's negligence was not the 
cause of the plaintiff's injury. The judges 
reasoned that since the plaintiff's health was 
at issue, the defendant had a right to use this 
information to show that it was the plain-
tiff's genetic condition that caused the 
injury. Moreover, they commented that the 
test was being used to confirm a diagnosis, 
not for prediction, and that compelling 
medical tests in these circumstances was 
well established. 
In the first torts case involving damages, 
the judges were almost evenly divided on 
whether they would compel a genetic test 
for neurofibromatosis for an asymptomatic 
21-year-old plaintiff with a family history 
ofNF2. Reasons for not compelling the test 
varied but focused on the psychological 
impact of predictive testing in the context of 
a damage calculation. Some judges indi-
cated that a jury would have difficulty 
understanding the information; others, 
however, felt that life tables could be used 
with an instruction about the meaning of the 
test. Those troubled by compelling the test 
raised the specter of predictive tests being 
used for breast cancer, heart disease, or 
other late-onset disorders. Some judges, in 
contrast, commented that they might admit 
predictive information in some cases, for 
example, when the plaintiff smokes and sta-
tistically has a reduced life expectancy. 
The majority of judges agreed to admit, 
at the plaintiff's request, a positive genetic 
test for heightened sensitivity to pain. A 
few judges thought it would be very help-
ful to have an "objective" test for pain. 
Others said they were more likely to admit 
a test than to compel one. The few who 
would not admit the test expressed concern 
that the "test was not sufficiently predic-
tive" or that the jury would weigh the test 
result inappropriately. 
In sum, while many of the judicial 
respondents recognized the complexity of 
these decisions, these cases raise new chal-
lenges for judges. In addition to the con-
cerns raised by respondents about rele-
vancy and juror understanding, these 
genetic tests have impacts that are distinct 
from genetic tests used only for purposes of 
identity. Many genetic tests for health and 
behavioral traits have the potential to pre-
dict diseases and conditions that have no 
prospect of treatment or cure, as well as the 
ability to affect both family members and 
individuals. We therefore recommend that 
judges scrutinize the admitting or com-
pelling of each of these new tests in the 
context in which its use is proposed. This 
scrutiny is particularly important because, 
if compelled, individuals and their families 
are forced to obtain genetic information 
without consent. Furthermore, for those 
individuals who have chosen to be tested in 
a medical setting, the informed consent 
process for genetic testing does not cur-
rently take into consideration the risk that 
genetic information may be admitted in 
future court proceedings. 
We encourage judges to be cautious 
and to consider the following when evalu-
ating the need for genetic information in 
legal cases: 
1) What is the evidentiary context? Is it 
to admit or compel the test? Is it a civil or 
criminal case? Is it being requested by the 
prosecution or the defense or the plaintiff or 
defendant? Whereas a decision to admit 
requires an understanding of the scientific 
value of the test in the context of a specific 
case, a request to compel deserves elevated 
scrutiny in light of the involuntary nature 
and psychological impact of the testing. 
Moreover, given the potential constitutional 
infringement and impact on individual lib-
erty, requests by a prosecutor to admit or 
compel a test in a preconviction criminal 
case should require a higher showing of 
"need" and "probative value" before the 
request is granted. 
2) What is the nature of the genetic con-
dition at issue? Is it a mental or physical 
condition? Is it congenital or late onset? 
How serious are the symptoms? Is there a 
cure or treatment? Information regarding a 
mental condition may raise heightened con-
cerns about privacy and stigma, whereas 
information about the possibility of devel-
oping a serious, incurable disease in the 
future may have a serious psychological 
impact on an individual or their relatives 
who may not wish to know their own 
genetic status. Furthermore, if the party to 
be tested is a child, unable to provide 
informed consent, additional consideration 
should be given to the psychological impact 
and stigma associated with disclosure of the 
information. 
3) How predictive is the test for the 
genetic condition? Is the condition caused 
by a single gene mutation or is it a more 
complex disorder resulting from interaction 
between gene mutations and environmental 
factors? For a late-onset disease, use of the 
test for predictive purposes requires greater 
caution as, for most complex genetic disor-
ders, the test will only indicate that an indi-
vidual has a susceptibility to a disease; it 
will not be determinative. Even if a test 
indicates that someone has a high probabil-
ity of developing the genetic disease or con-
dition, it cannot be used to determine the 
age at which someone will exhibit symp-
toms or the seriousness with which the con-
dition will manifest. Moreover, although a 
positive genetic test may not rule out negli-
gence or environmental factors as the cause 
of a developmental disability, it may change 
the damage calculation in torts cases and 
challenge the ability of medical experts and 
scientists to determine the degree of dam-
age attributable to different causes. 
4) What are the social policy implica-
tions of judges routinely compelling or 
admitting health-related genetic tests? Will 
this impact the willingness of individuals to 
obtain beneficial genetic tests in the health 
care setting or participate in genetic 
research? Will it validate claims of genetic 
determinism and contribute to the develop-
ment of an unintended social norm regard-
ing the meaning of genetic makeup? 
In conclusion, decision-making in these 
cases will be complex and will require 
judges to simultaneously consider multiple 
factors. We hope that these recommended 
questions for consideration will provide 
guidance to judges as they are increasingly 
asked to decide whether to admit or compel 
this new generation of genetic tests. 
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